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THE ALASKAN VARIABLE: A CALL 
FOR EDUCATION CLAUSE 




The provision of public education in Alaska is a task as monumental as the state 
itself, requiring innovative solutions to unique challenges faced within the 
state. The drafters of the Alaska Constitution understood this dilemma and 
granted the state legislature broad power under the education clause. Early 
supreme court jurisprudence interpreted this mandate broadly and granted 
considerable deference. However, recent school funding cases have seen the 
court’s jurisprudence shift to focus on different constitutional provisions and 
neglect an education clause analysis. The supreme court now has an 
opportunity to change this. Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy is 
currently pending before the court and offers the chance to expand on the 
superior court’s cursory education clause analysis. This Note argues that the 
court should decide the case under an explicit education clause analysis in order 
to realign its school funding jurisprudence with the early education clause 
cases. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Alaska is an educational paradox. “Despite some of the highest 
expenditures per pupil in the country, Alaska’s K-12 education system is 
plagued by poor test scores, absenteeism, and low graduation rates.”1 The 
state performs admirably by any measure of school funding. Its per-pupil 
spending is second highest in the nation at $18,586 per student.2 The 
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 1.  Win Gruening, Educational Changes Will Happen Through Local Involvement, 
MUST READ ALASKA (Aug. 24, 2019), https://mustreadalaska.com/educational-
changes-will-happen-through-local-involvement/. 
 2.  BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT 
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Education Law Center gives Alaska the highest possible grade for fiscal 
effort, an index evaluating local and state education spending based on 
the gross state product and aggregate personal income.3 However, this 
spending does not correlate with K-12 outcomes. Education Week’s 
Quality Counts Report Card ranks Alaska second-to-last among states in 
its K-12 Achievement Index and forty-second in the Chance-for-Success 
category.4 Alaska’s unique history and challenges distinguish it from 
other states in many areas of everyday life, including public education, 
and likely drive these disparities in spending and educational outcomes. 
This “‘Alaskan variable’ must be taken into account as an important factor 
in all decisions about education in Alaska.”5 
The drafters of the Alaska Constitution foresaw that the Alaskan 
variable would shape the public school system in Alaska.6 Thus, the 
drafters granted the state legislature broad power under article VII, 
section 1 of the Alaska Constitution (“education clause”), which states 
that “[t]he legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system 
of public schools open to all children of the State, and may provide for 
other public educational institutions.”7 The Alaska Supreme Court’s early 
education clause jurisprudence reflected the weight of the Alaskan 
variable in the public schooling context and tracked the drafters’ intent to 
grant the legislature broad deference in the realm of public education.8 
Recent public schooling cases have pivoted from litigating the broad 
right of students’ access to public education to more specific challenges to 
school funding mechanisms.9 The supreme court upheld the 
constitutionality of two different statutory school funding schemes on 
various constitutional grounds, but in neither case did the court 
adequately weigh the education clause’s mandate to “establish and 
 
CARD 10 (7th ed. 2018). 
 3.  Id. at 15–17, 21. 
 4.  Educational Opportunities and Performance in Alaska, EDUCATION WEEK 
(Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/01/16/highlights-
report-alaska.html. The K-12 Achievement Index “examines 18 distinct 
achievement measures.” Id. The Chance-for-Success Index is designed “to better 
understand the role of education across an individual’s lifetime.” State Highlights 
Reports, EDUCATION WEEK (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/ew/ 
collections/quality-counts-2020/state-and-national-highlights-reports-quality-
counts.html. 
 5.  See Carol Barnhardt, A History of Schooling for Alaska Native People, 40 J. 
AM. INDIAN EDUC. 1, 2 (2001) (“The historical, political, cultural, economic and 
geographical contexts of Alaska are distinct enough from other states, that the 
‘Alaskan variable’ must be taken into account as an important factor in all 
decisions about education in Alaska.”). 
 6.  See infra Section IV.C.2. 
 7.  ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 8.  See infra Sections II.D.1, II.D.2. 
 9.  See infra Section II.D. 
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maintain a system of public schools.”10 In shifting its focus away from the 
education clause, the supreme court has also precluded consideration of 
the Alaskan variable in public education cases. As a subset of public 
schooling cases, school funding cases should be primarily analyzed under 
the education clause, so long as the legislature has implemented funding 
schemes pursuant to its education clause duties “to establish and 
maintain a system of public schools.”11 Under this analysis, the party 
challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of 
demonstrating that a constitutional violation exists.12 The court should 
resolve any doubts in favor of constitutionality.13 Thus, unless the party 
opposing a school funding scheme demonstrates that other constitutional 
factors prevail, the education clause mandate and broad legislative 
discretion should dictate a presumption of constitutionality for such a 
scheme. 
Another statutory school funding scheme, forward funding, was 
recently implicated in Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy.14 In its 2018 
session, the legislature forward funded K-12 education by passing 
appropriations for the following fiscal year to provide school districts 
with greater budgetary predictability.15 This was in response to Alaska 
school districts struggling to retain quality teachers due to the budgetary 
uncertainty caused by the misalignment of the fiscal year and the 
academic year.16 Governor Mike Dunleavy challenged the scheme as 
unconstitutional and withheld the school funding appropriations.17 In 
July 2019, the Alaska State Legislature sued Governor Dunleavy to 
compel payment of the past appropriations made for the forward funding 
of Alaska’s public schools.18 The superior court found forward funding 
 
 10.  ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; see infra Sections II.D.3, II.D.4. 
 11.  ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; see infra Sections III.D.3, III.D.4. 
 12.  State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86, 102 (Alaska 2016) 
 (Winfree, J., concurring) (citing State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 209 (Alaska 1982)). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, Alaska Legislative 
Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2019), 
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/order3.pdf. 
 15.  Act of May 3, 2018, 2018 Alaska Sess. Laws. ch. 6. 
 16.  ARNOLD LIEBELT, HB 287 EDUCATION AND PUPIL TRANSPORTATION: AN 
EARLY AND STAND-ALONE APPROPRIATION BILL 2 (2018), http://www.akleg.gov/ 
basis/get_documents.asp?session=30&docid=39001. 
 17.  Matt Buxton, The Legislature Is Ready to Sue If Dunleavy Follows Through on 
Threat to Withhold K-12 Funding, THE MIDNIGHT SUN (May 28, 2019), 
http://midnightsunak.com/2019/05/28/legislature-readies-lawsuit-if-
dunleavy-follows-through-on-threat-to-withhold-k-12-funding/. 
 18.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and An Accounting at 1–
2, Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. 
July 16, 2019), https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/ 
complaint.pdf. 
37.1 LAWS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2020  10:18 PM 
90 ALASKA LAW REVIEW 37:1 
constitutional, reasoning that the education clause’s mandate and the 
legislature’s corresponding discretion outweighed other constitutional 
limitations on appropriations.19  However, much of the court’s analysis 
centered on other constitutional provisions, with limited and at times 
implicit analysis of the education clause outside of acknowledging its 
basic directive and importance. The Governor appealed the case to the 
Supreme Court of Alaska on December 13, 2019.20 
This Note argues that in Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, the 
supreme court should shift its school funding jurisprudence to require a 
thorough analysis under the education clause, which would better align 
with its early public education cases. Part II explores the history of the 
Alaska public school system and the shift in the supreme court’s public 
education jurisprudence away from the education clause analysis. Part III 
introduces and summarizes Alaska Legislative Council. Finally, Part IV 
argues that school funding cases, including Alaska Legislative Council, 
cannot be properly analyzed without a thorough analysis of the education 
clause. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM IN ALASKA 
A.  Public Education Prior to Statehood 
Prior to statehood in 1959, Alaska operated under a dual system of 
public education in which schooling was provided by both the federal 
government and the Territory of Alaska.21 The first public schools in 
Alaska were operated by the federal government.22 The Organic Act of 
1884 established these schools, providing “[t]hat the Secretary of the 
Interior shall make needful and proper provision for the education of 
children of school age in the Territory of Alaska.”23 The dual system 
emerged with the passage of the Nelson Act in 1905, which established 
new territorial schools for “white children and children of mixed blood 
who lead a civilized life.”24 These schools were to be operated under the 
 
 19.  See Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 6 
(reasoning that the education clause did not require specific sources of revenue to 
be spent in violation of the dedicated funds clause).  
 20.  Dunleavy v. Alaska Legislative Council, No. S17666 (Alaska Dec. 13, 
2019), https://appellate-records.courts.alaska.gov/CMSPublic/Case/General? 
caseID=25798.  
 21.  Barnhardt, supra note 5, at 11. 
 22.  ALASKA DEP’T OF EDUC. AND EARLY DEV., HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF 
EDUCATION HISTORY IN ALASKA 1 (2011), http://www.akleg.gov/basis/ 
get_documents.asp?session=27&docid=28. 
 23.  Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 13, 23 Stat. 24, 27–28 (1884). 
 24.  Act of Jan. 27, 1905, ch. 277, § 7, 33 Stat. 616, 619 (1905). 
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supervision of the Governor of the Territory of Alaska, acting as ex officio 
superintendent.25 The Nelson Act further provided that, unlike “white 
children and children of mixed blood,” the education of Alaska Native 
children was to be provided for by the federal government.26 The Alaska 
Native Service, the Alaska Branch of the Bureau of Indian Affairs,27 
operated these schools.28 
Over the next several decades, attempts were made to unify the dual 
system. The responsibility for the education of Alaska Native children 
was to be “transferred from Federal to Territorial jurisdiction as rapidly 
as conditions justif[ied].”29 However, these attempts were unsuccessful 
because the territory could not financially support any additional public 
schools.30 Localities did not provide significant financial support; 
territorial schools were reimbursed seventy-five to eighty-five percent of 
their operating costs by the territorial government.31 At the time of 
statehood, the territorial government supported eighty-eight schools 
while the federal government operated approximately one hundred 
schools.32 Located in remote, isolated villages that lacked territorial 
schools, the federally-run schools were operated by the Alaska Native 
Service with the purpose of providing education to Alaska Native 
children.33 The curriculum focused on “teaching beginners English and 
familiarizing [Alaska Native children] with American ways of life.”34 The 
Alaska Native Service also operated three boarding schools that enrolled 
Alaska Native students from across the entire territory.35 
B. Development of Public Education from Statehood Onwards 
The transition from territory to state required drafting a new state 
constitution. One of the goals of the Alaska constitutional convention was 
to adopt a unified public school system.36 In contemplating the issues of 
 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  JAMES P. DAVIS, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR OFFICE OF TERRITORIES, MID-CENTURY 
ALASKA 55 (1952). 
 28.  Barnhardt, supra note 5, at 11. The Bureau of Indian Affairs was preceded 
by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Education. Id. 
 29.  Id. at 55. 
 30.  Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 800 (Alaska 
1975). 
 31.  DAVIS, supra note 27, at 58. 
 32.  Id. at 55. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 61. 
 35.  Id. at 62. 
 36.  See Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 800 (Alaska 
1975) (“The problem of creating a viable, unified system of public education in 
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public education, the framers were cognizant that a statewide public 
school system would face challenges unique to Alaska.37 Alaska is by far 
the largest state in the union.38 It is also the least densely populated state.39 
At 35.8%, the rural population is a significantly higher proportion of the 
population than the national average of 17.4%.40 Alaska’s school 
demographics reflect this difference; over half of Alaska’s 506 schools are 
rural schools,41 yet these schools enroll only about one-third of all K-12 
students in the state.42 
With these conditions in mind, as well as the history of the dual 
educational system, the members of the constitutional convention sought 
to adopt a unified public school system. To this end, Alaska adopted the 
education clause, which mandates that “[t]he legislature shall by general 
law establish and maintain a system of public schools open to all children 
of the State.”43 The Alaska Supreme Court held that the phrase “open to 
all” is “a unitary phrase embodying a requirement of nonsegregated 
schools” and indicates an intent to adopt a unified system of public 
schooling.44 The court reasoned that the phrasing in the constitution 
diverged from common phrasings of other state constitutions because the 
drafters were focused on a unitary, but not uniform, public school system 
due to “the unique problems in the vast rural areas of Alaska.”45 
The vastness of Alaska also influenced the structure of the state’s 
local government, which in turn impacted the governance of school 
districts. Alaska has a unique local government structure; it is one of only 
two states that is not organized into counties.46 Instead, the drafters 
 
this state confronted the framers of our constitution when they convened in 
1955.”). 
 37.  See infra Section III.B.2. 
 38.  Dylan Matthews, Alaska Is Big. Alaska.org Wants to Show You Exactly How 
Big., VOX (Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2015/4/25/8492577/alaska-is-
very-big. 
 39.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS: POPULATION DENSITY DATA (TEXT 
VERSION) (2010), https://www.census.gov/content/census/en/data/tables/ 
2010/dec/density-data-text.html. 
 40.  JOHN CROMARTIE & SHAWN BUCHOLTZ, U.S. DEP’T OF ARGIC., ALASKA - 
RURAL DEFINITIONS: STATE-LEVEL MAPS 6 (2007). 
 41.  EMEKA EMEKAUWA, THE STAR WITH MY NAME: THE ALASKA RURAL SYSTEMIC 
INITIATIVE AND THE IMPACT OF PLACE-BASED EDUCATION ON NATIVE STUDENT 
ACHIEVEMENT 2 (Doris Terry Williams ed., 2004). 
 42.  MARK GLANDER, U.S. NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, SELECTED 
STATISTICS FROM THE PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION UNIVERSE: 
SCHOOL YEAR 2015–16 11 (2017), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018052.pdf. 
 43.  ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 44.  Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 801–02 (Alaska 
1975). 
 45.  Id. at 801–03. 
 46.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHIC AREAS REFERENCE MANUAL: STATES, 
COUNTIES, AND STATISTICALLY EQUIVALENT ENTITIES ch. 4, 2 (1994), https:// 
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envisioned a new form of local government for the rural and sparsely-
populated state.47 This system would allow for “local government 
adaptation in a state with great variations in geographic, economic, social, 
and political conditions.”48 The Alaska Constitution states that Alaska 
was to be divided into organized and unorganized boroughs.49 
Organized boroughs are one form of municipal government 
provided by the Alaska Constitution.50 There are currently nineteen 
organized boroughs, which cover forty-five percent of the land mass.51 In 
areas of the state “in which social, economic, and political resources could 
not yet sustain a viable system of local self-government, boroughs would 
remain ‘unorganized’ and the state government would provide for their 
needs directly, or through whatever local instrumentalities were deemed 
appropriate.”52 State legislation has subsequently provided that all land 
outside of the organized boroughs is to be incorporated into a single 
unorganized borough.53 This unorganized borough cannot have a 
municipal government under the state constitution. Rather, “[t]he 
legislature shall provide for the performance of services it deems 
necessary or advisable” in the unorganized borough.54 
Cities are the second form of municipal government established by 
the constitution.55 There are 144 city governments in Alaska.56 City 
governments can exist within organized boroughs or the unorganized 
borough.57 City governments that exist within an organized borough 
government can be unified with the borough’s municipal government; 
this unified government is treated as an organized borough by the state 
legislature.58 The city, borough, and unified municipal governments were 
designed to provide local services, including public school systems.59 
Section 14.12.010 of the Alaska Statutes governs the provision of 
 
www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/reference/GARM/Ch4GARM.pdf. 
 47.  THOMAS A. MOREHOUSE & VICTOR FISCHER, BOROUGH GOVERNMENT IN 
ALASKA: A STUDY OF STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS 5 (1971). 
 48.  LOCAL BOUNDARY COMM’N STAFF, ALASKA DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CMTY, & 
ECON. DEV., LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ALASKA 8–9 (2015), https:// 
www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Portals/4/pub/2015%20%20LOCAL%20GOV
ERNMENT%20IN%20ALASKA.pdf. 
 49.  ALASKA CONST. art. X, §§ 3, 6.  
 50.  Id. § 2. 
 51.  LOCAL BOUNDARY COMM’N STAFF, supra note 48, at 2. 
 52.  MOREHOUSE & FISCHER, supra note 47, at 6. 
 53.  ALASKA STAT. § 29.03.010 (2018). 
 54.  ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 6.  
 55.  LOCAL BOUNDARY COMM’N STAFF, supra note 48, at 1. 
 56.  Id. at 1.  
 57.  Id. at 3. 
 58.  Id. at 4 n.1. 
 59.  Id. at 18–19. 
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public school systems.60 Under subsection (2), “each organized borough 
is a borough school district.”61 Within organized boroughs, city 
governments are not permitted to provide public schooling.62 There are 
nineteen borough school districts in Alaska.63 In the unorganized 
borough, public education is provided for by either city governments or 
Regional Education Attendance Areas (REAAs), which are “state service 
areas to provide public education to the unorganized borough.”64 There 
are fifteen city school districts in the unorganized borough.65 The rest of 
the unorganized borough is divided into nineteen REAAs.66 
The majority of funding for all public schools in Alaska comes from 
the state government, rather than local governments.67 Nationally, K-12 
schools are funded approximately equally by the state and local 
governments with forty-seven percent of nationwide K-12 funding 
provided by states and forty-five percent by local governments.68 In 
Alaska, the majority of public school funding, approximately sixty-five 
percent, comes from the state.69 Local contributions total just twenty-
seven percent.70 This is for two primary reasons. First, unlike in other 
states, Alaska schools were not historically provided for at the local level, 
but instead were provided for by the territorial and federal 
governments.71 Second, the majority of land in Alaska, approximately 
ninety percent, is publicly owned.72 The federal government owns sixty 
 
 60.  ALASKA STAT. § 14.12.010 (2018). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  LOCAL BOUNDARY COMM’N STAFF, supra note 48, at 10. 
 63.  CLIVE S. THOMAS ET AL., ALASKA POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE 
DYNAMICS OF BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND POWER 944 (2016).  
 64.  LOCAL BOUNDARY COMM’N STAFF, supra note 48, at 13. There are three 
classes of city in Alaska: home rule cities, first-class cities, and second-class cities. 
Home rule and first-class cities must provide public education. Second-class cities 
are not permitted to provide public education; it is provided for by REAAs or the 
organized borough. Id. at 18. 
 65.  THOMAS ET AL., supra note 63. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  MATTHEW D. BERMAN ET AL., PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAMS OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANADA: 1998-99: ALASKA 1–3 (2001), https://nces.ed.gov/ 
edfin/pdf/StFinance/Alaska.pdf. 
 68.  URBAN INST., ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION EXPENDITURES, 
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-
finance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/elementary-and-secondary-
education-expenditures (last visited May 6, 2020).  
 69.  LEGISLATIVE FIN. DIV., INFORMATIONAL PAPER 17-2: OPTIONS FOR REDUCING 
STATE FUNDING OF ALASKA’S SCHOOLS 1 (2017). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See DAVIS, supra note 27, at 58 (discussing how appropriations for public 
schools in 1952 came primarily from the territory’s budget). 
 72.  STATE OF ALASKA, STATE HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN ch. 2, 3 (2018), 
https://ready.alaska.gov/Plans/Mitigation/Documents/Alaska%20State%20M
itigation%20Plan/Ch02-AlaskasBackgroundInformation.pdf. 
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percent of Alaska land.73 The state owns approximately thirty percent.74 
Roughly ten percent is Native land.75 Excluding Native land, less than one 
percent of land is privately owned.76 This ownership breakdown has a 
significant impact on the school funding in Alaska because the Required 
Local Contribution, school funding statutorily mandated from organized 
borough school districts as part of the State’s school funding formula, is 
set at a percentage tax based on real property value.77 In addition, REAAs, 
which account for nearly half of Alaska’s school districts, cannot levy 
taxes and receive all of their funding from the State.78 
C.  The Public School System in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court of Alaska has heard several cases on Alaska’s 
public school system. The first cases centered on the interpretation of the 
education clause and the constitutional duties it imposed on the 
legislature. The second line of cases pivoted more specifically to school 
funding and emphasized constitutional provisions other than the 
education clause. 
1.  Macauley v. Hildebrand 
In 1971, the Supreme Court of Alaska heard its first case on public 
education, Macauley v. Hildebrand.79 The dispute arose between the Juneau 
School Board (School Board) and the unified City and Borough of Juneau 
(Borough) as to which of the bodies had control over funds appropriated 
for the operation of schools.80 The School Board sought injunctive relief 
prohibiting the Borough from centralizing the accounting system for 
school funds with the Borough, rather than with the School Board.81 In 
rejecting this centralization, the School Board relied on a state statute that 
required a borough school board consent to such centralizing of funds, 
 
 73.  ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES., LAND OWNERSHIP IN ALASKA 2 (2000), 
http://dnr.alaska.gov/mlw/factsht/land_fs/land_own.pdf. 
 74.  See STATE OF ALASKA, supra note 72, at 4 (stating that the State of Alaska 
owns 105 million acres of the state’s total area).  
 75.  See id. (stating that Alaska Native Lands comprise 44 million acres of the 
state’s total area). 
 76.  ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 73, at 2.  
 77.  LEGISLATIVE FIN. DIV., supra note 69, at 1. The Required Local Contribution 
is generally set at 2.65 mills on real property value but might be lower for some 
districts. Id. Some districts are capped at forty-five percent of funding for the 
preceding year due to “unusually high property values relative to population.” 
Id. at 1 n.1.  
 78.  Making the Most of Your First Term: Introduction to School Finance, ASS’N OF 
ALASKA SCH. BDS., https://aasb.org/school-finance/ (last visited May 6, 2020). 
 79.  491 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1971). 
 80.  Id. at 120–21. 
 81.  Id. at 121. 
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which it had not.82 
Though the question presented to the court did not directly implicate 
the education clause, the court’s holding turned on whether the 
regulation of public school systems “was of statewide or local concern.”83 
In resolving this question, the court established that the education clause 
“constitutionally mandated state control over education” for three 
reasons.84 First, the language—”[t]he legislature shall”—is mandatory, 
rather than permissive.85 Second, the legislature is required to “maintain” 
an educational system.86 Third, the obligation to provide public schooling 
is given solely to the legislature.87 However, the state may still delegate 
some functions to local school boards in order to “meet the varying 
conditions of different localities” under the constitutional mandate of the 
education clause.88 The supreme court therefore instructed that judgment 
be entered for the School Board. 
2.  Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School Systems 
The court next addressed whether the education clause requires the 
legislature to provide public secondary schools in rural Alaska 
communities. In Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School Systems,89 Alaska 
Natives sought to compel the State to provide secondary schools in their 
communities of residence in rural western Alaska.90 None of the plaintiffs’ 
villages had public secondary schools, but the State provided four 
alternative schooling options: (1) attendance at a state-operated regional 
school, (2) attendance at a Bureau of Indian Affairs school, (3) attendance 
at a non-local public secondary school through the state boarding home 
program, or (4) participation in state-funded correspondence study.91 The 
superior court severed the education clause claim from the rest of the suit 
and awarded summary judgment to the defendants.92 The only issue 
before the supreme court on appeal of the summary judgment was 
whether the lack of public secondary schools in the plaintiffs’ local 
communities denied them of the right to education.93 
The court considered three grounds that might establish a 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 122. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  536 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1975). 
 90.  Id. at 796. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 797. 
 93.  Id.  
37.1 LAWS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2020  10:18 PM 
2020 THE ALASKAN VARIABLE 97 
constitutional right to public education within the students’ local 
communities: (1) that public school attendance is a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the education clause, (2) that state Board of Education 
regulations required the provision of local secondary schools, and (3) that 
the denial violated the equal protection guarantees in the constitution.94 
With regard to the second ground, the court held that because the state 
Board of Education had repealed the regulations requiring provision of 
local education and the repeal was not arbitrary, the court could not grant 
relief under the former regulations.95 On the third ground, the court 
declined to rule on the equal protection claim because it overlapped with 
claims still pending before the superior court that similarly invoked the 
equal protection clause.96 
On the education clause argument, the court noted that Macauley 
recognized a “dual aspect” of the education clause; it both “imposes a 
duty upon the state legislature, and it confers upon Alaska school-age 
children a right to education.”97 The court then examined whether this 
right to education included attendance at a secondary school within one’s 
home community.98 Although the purpose of the education clause was to 
establish a unitary school system “designed to serve children of all racial 
backgrounds,” the clause did not require that there be uniformity in such 
a system.99 The court reasoned that the drafters were well aware of the 
unique challenges that the state would face: 
It seems likely that the drafters of the constitution had in mind 
the vast expanses of Alaska, its many isolated small 
communities which lack effective transportation and 
communication systems, and the diverse culture and heritage of 
its citizens. Since educational programs may well require special 
design to confront the divergent problems presented, a 
uniformity requirement in the Alaska education system might 
well prove unworkable.100 
The court found this consistent with its earlier observation in Macauley 
that governing Alaska schools requires flexibility in order to “meet the 
varying conditions of different localities.”101 Therefore, the education 
clause “permits some differences in the manner of providing education,” 
and the State was not required to provide secondary schools in the 
 
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Id. at 806–07. 
 96.  Id. at 808. 
 97.  Id. at 799. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 801. 
 100.  Id. at 803. 
 101.  Id. (quoting Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971)). 
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plaintiffs’ local communities.102 The court held that the education clause 
could be fulfilled through “different types of educational opportunities 
including boarding, correspondence and other programs without 
requiring that all options be available to all students.”103 
3.  Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District v. State 
The next line of education cases shifted from the provision of 
education to school funding. In Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District 
v. State,104 plaintiffs were a coalition consisting of the Matanuska-Susitna 
Borough, the Matanuska-Susitna School District, and individual plaintiffs 
challenging two Alaska public school funding laws under the state equal 
protection clause.105 One statute provided state reimbursements for 
boroughs and cities to recover up to seventy percent of debt incurred for 
school construction.106 This provision was not applicable to REAAs.107 A 
second statute provided REAAs with state grants for school construction 
if they contributed two percent of project costs.108 These grants were not 
available to borough and city municipal school districts.109 Plaintiffs 
argued that the statutory scheme created two classes of students: those in 
borough and city municipal school districts that only receive state 
funding for seventy percent of school construction costs and those in 
REAAs that receive state funding for ninety-eight percent of school 
construction costs.110 
In affirming the superior court’s ruling that there was no equal 
protection violation, the supreme court examined the State’s purpose in 
enacting the statutes.111 It reasoned that the State had a legitimate purpose 
in the funding programs: “to assure an equitable level of educational 
opportunities for those in attendance in the public schools of the state.”112 
Under the Alaska Constitution, REAAs may not levy taxes.113 The 
statutory scheme offset this “difference[] in constitutional status between 
REAAs and borough and city school districts.”114 The legislature is given 
significant discretion in determining means by which to promote public 
 
 102.  Id. at 804. 
 103.  Id. at 803. 
 104.  931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997). 
 105.  Id. at 394. 
 106.  Id. at 395. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 396. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 396–97. 
 112.  Id. at 399. 
 113.  Id. (citing ALASKA CONST. art X, § 2). 
 114.  Id. at 400. 
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policy objectives.115 Additionally, in cases of school funding, the 
legislature is “acting in furtherance of its constitutionally mandated duty 
to maintain and control a statewide system of public schools,” which adds 
weight to the legitimacy of the state purpose.116 Therefore, the court held 
the statutory scheme for funding school construction constitutional under 
the state equal protection clause.117 
4.  State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough 
In the most recent public education case, State v. Ketchikan Gateway 
Borough,118 the court affirmed the constitutionality of the statutorily-
mandated Required Local Contribution (RLC), local money required of 
organized boroughs to support their school districts as part of the State’s 
school funding formula.119 The plaintiffs were individual taxpayers and 
the Ketchikan Gateway Borough (“Borough”), an organized borough 
required to annually pay the RLC.120 The Borough paid the RLC under 
protest and filed a suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute 
was unconstitutional, injunctive relief enjoining the State from 
compelling compliance, and compensatory damages for the amount 
paid.121 The Borough argued that because of the RLC, the state 
underfunded the Borough, forcing it and the taxpayers to make up the 
difference.122 
Plaintiffs alleged that the RLC was unconstitutional on three bases: 
(1) it violated article IX, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution (“dedicated 
funds clause”) by impermissibly dedicating a state tax for a particular 
purpose, (2) it exceeded the appropriations power of the state legislature 
because it is paid directly to the municipal district instead of the state 
treasury, and (3) it impeded the Governor’s veto power because in 
circumventing the state treasury it bypasses the Governor’s potential 
veto.123 The superior court granted the Borough’s motion for summary 
judgment on the first claim, ruling that the RLC was unconstitutional 
under the dedicated funds clause, but denied Plaintiffs’ motion on the 
other two claims.124 
 
 115.  Id. at 402. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  366 P.3d 86 (Alaska 2016). 
 119.  Id. at 87. 
 120.  Complaint at 1, State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86 (Alaska 
2016) (No. 1KE-14-16 Civil), https://www.kgbak.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/ 
Item/357. 
 121.  Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d at 89. 
 122.  Complaint, supra note 120, at 8. 
 123.  Id. at 9–10. The RLC payment “never enters the state treasury, and it is 
never subject to appropriations bills.” Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d at 101. 
 124.  Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d at 89. 
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The supreme court reviewed all three arguments and reversed the 
superior court.125 The court held that the RLC did not violate the 
dedicated funds clause, noting the historical practice of local communities 
sharing some responsibility for funding schools dating back prior to 
statehood.126 The drafters did not intend to alter this practice, as 
demonstrated by subsequent legislation which established a framework 
of joint state and local public school funding.127 The court differentiated 
this case from its dedicated funds clause jurisprudence, noting that the 
dedicated funds clause had not been considered in a school funding 
context.128 It further dismissed the claims under the appropriations clause 
and the governor’s veto clause, finding no issue under either.129 
In two concurring opinions, Chief Justice Stowers and Justice 
Winfree noted that the court limited its holding to the dedicated funds 
clause and declined to analyze the statute in the context of the education 
clause.130 Both justices asserted that the constitutionality of the school 
funding regulation could not be decided without reviewing the education 
clause.131 Justice Winfree conducted a cursory analysis of the case under 
the education clause and expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of the 
RLC, but noted that the issue was purposefully not briefed and therefore 
left the question open for future consideration.132 
III. ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL V. DUNLEAVY 
A. Factual Background 
At issue in Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy133 was House Bill 287 
(“HB 287”), “[a]n Act making appropriations for public education and 
transportation of students.”134 The bill was introduced to the House 
Finance Committee in January 2018 by Representative Paul Seaton, who 
explained that the idea for the proposed legislation came from a meeting 
of school superintendents.135 The superintendents expressed concerns 
about retaining quality teachers because the misalignment between the 
 
 125.  Id. at 90.  
 126.  Id. at 91–102. 
 127.  Id. at 96. 
 128.  Id. at 98–102. 
 129.  Id. at 101–02. 
 130.  Id. at 102 (Stowers, C.J., concurring); id. (Winfree, J., concurring).  
 131.  Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d at 102 (Winfree, J., concurring). 
 132.  Id. at 103–05.  
 133.  Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14. 
 134.  Id. at 1. 
 135.  ALASKA H. FIN. COMM., MINUTES, 30th Leg. (Jan. 25, 2018) (statement of 
Representative Paul Seaton at 9:04:12 AM). 
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academic and financial years had been exacerbated by delays in the 
legislature passing the state operating budget.136 The bill forward funded 
K-12 schools for the following fiscal year.137 This funding was intended to 
eliminate uncertainty created by the misalignment of the school and fiscal 
years and prevent unnecessary teacher layoffs.138 Initial justification for 
the bill included compliance with the constitutional requirements for the 
provision of public education.139 
After several months of amendments and discussions, both houses 
of the state legislature passed HB 287 and transmitted the bill to then-
Governor Bill Walker.140 Governor Walker signed the bill into law on May 
5, 2018.141 The bill was to take effect on July 1, 2019, and “appropriate[d] 
full funding for public school districts in the state and for transportation 
of students, as well as one-time additional money for public schools, for 
the fiscal year 2020.”142 
At the end of 2018, Mike Dunleavy was elected governor after 
incumbent Bill Walker dropped out of the gubernatorial race.143 One of 
the key issues in Dunleavy’s platform was “fully funding” Alaska 
residents’ Permanent Fund Dividend, the annual payments made to each 
resident from the State’s oil revenue.144 Governor Walker had reduced the 
dividend after oil prices plummeted in 2015.145 Upon entering office, 
Governor-elect Dunleavy proposed a budget that would cut spending by 
$650 million to decrease the state deficit and fulfill his campaign promise 
to fully fund the Permanent Fund Dividend.146 This proposal sparked a 
 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Act of May 3, 2018, 2018 Alaska Sess. Laws. ch. 6. 
 138.  LIEBELT, supra note 16, at 2. While the bill was first proposed to be funded 
by the Constitutional Budget Reserve and the Statutory Budget Reserve Fund, id. 
at 4, the final version was funded through appropriations from the general fund. 
Act of May 3, 2018, 2018 Alaska Sess. Laws. ch. 6. 
 139.  ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 30th Leg. (Jan. 25, 2018) (statement of 
Arnold Liebelt, Staff, Representative Paul Seaton at 9:11:03 AM).  
 140.  ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 30th Leg., 2d Sess. 2707 (Apr. 14, 2018); ALASKA H. 
JOURNAL, 30th Leg., 2d Sess. 3360, 3506 (Apr. 14, 2018). The bill was transmitted as 
Senate CS for House Bill No. 287(FIN). ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 30th Leg., 2d Sess. 
3506 (Apr. 14, 2018). 
 141.  ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 30th Leg., 2d Sess. 3571 (May 4, 2018). 
 142.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and An Accounting, 
supra note 18, at 3. 
 143.  Dylan Scott, Mike Dunleavy Elected Governor of Alaska: Rare 2018 Pickup for 
Republicans, VOX (Nov. 7, 2018, 2:14 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/11/7/18055506/midterm-election-results-alaska-governor-mike-
dunleavy-winner. 
 144.  Tim Bradner, Post-Election PFD Discussion, ALASKANOMICS (Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://www.alaskanomics.com/2018/11/post-election-pfd-discussion.html. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  James Brooks, Governor Launches Plan to Deeply Cut Alaska State Spending, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.adn.com/politics/2019/ 
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budget crisis in Alaska.147 The Governor and legislature clashed over the 
budget and the Governor’s proposed cuts.148 Governor Dunleavy 
continued to slash the budget to fulfill campaign promises.149 The 
legislature fought back by proposing its own operating budget150 and 
reversing many of the Governor’s line-item vetoes.151 
In the midst of this budgetary back-and-forth, Governor Dunleavy 
took aim at the HB 287 appropriations.152 He announced that the State 
would not distribute the funds to local school districts and justified this 
withholding by stating that he viewed the funding as an illegal 
appropriation.153 The legislature insisted that the appropriations were 
enacted legally and must be paid.154 On June 13, 2019, the Alaska 
Legislative Council, a permanent committee of the state legislature, 
unanimously voted to “seek relief from the court that [the HB 287] funds 
be disbursed to school districts as intended by the Legislature.”155 
B.  Parties 
Plaintiff was the Alaska Legislative Council (“Plaintiff”).156 Plaintiff 
brought suit against Governor Mike Dunleavy in his official capacity and 
also named the Commissioner of Administration for the State of Alaska 
and the Commissioner of Education and Early Development of the State 
 
02/13/gov-dunleavy-launches-massive-budget-cut-plan/. 
 147.  Henry Olson, Alaska Shows Why Budget-Cutting Conservatives Are Destined 
to Fail, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/2019/08/19/alaska-shows-why-budget-cutting-conservatives-are-
destined-fail/. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See, e.g., Andrew Kitchenman, ‘It Won’t Be Easy’: Universities, Medicaid Hit 
Hard as Dunleavy Vetoes Nearly $400 Million from Budget, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (July 
1, 2019), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2019/07/01/it-wont-be-easy-
universities-medicaid-hit-hard-as-dunleavy-vetoes-nearly-400-million-from-
budget/ (describing budget cuts made by Governor Dunleavy in furtherance of 
campaign promises). 
 150.  Olson, supra note 147. 
 151. ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 31st Leg., 1st Sess. 1367 (October 23, 2019). The House 
budget was transmitted to the Governor on August 7, 2019 and signed into law 
on August 17, 2019. Id. at 1367, 1373.  
 152.  James Brooks, Governor Threatens No School Funding after July 1, Escalating 
Fight with Alaska Legislature, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (May 21, 2019), 
https://www.adn.com/politics/alaska-legislature/2019/05/22/governor-
vows-no-school-funding-after-july-1-escalating-fight-with-alaska-legislature/.  
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  ALASKA LEGIS. COUNCIL MINUTES, 31st Leg. (June 13, 2019) (statement of 
Megan Wallace, Director, Legal Services, Legislative Affairs Agency at 4:00:10 
PM). 
 156.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and An Accounting, 
supra note 18, at 1. 
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of Alaska as co-defendants (“Defendants”).157 The Coalition for Education 
Equity, Inc. (CEE), a non-profit based in Anchorage that promotes “a 
quality, equitable and adequate public education for every Alaska child 
through advocacy, policy development and legal action,” moved to 
intervene.158 The court granted leave for CEE to intervene on the 
consequences for education funding should Defendants prevail, but 
prohibited the organization from litigating the Alaska Constitution’s 
requirements for state funded education, justifying this limitation on the 
basis of the issue’s magnitude and complexity.159 
C. Claims 
Plaintiff brought suit to compel the disbursement of the funding 
provided for in HB 287.160 It presented three claims for the disbursement 
of the funds all provided for by HB 287: (1) funding for public schools, (2) 
funding for the transportation of students, and (3) a one-time grant to the 
Department of Education and Early Development.161 Under each claim, 
Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the failure 
to distribute the funds appropriated under HB 287 prevented the 
legislature from meeting its constitutional obligations under the 
education clause.162 
D.  Procedural Posture 
The Alaska Legislative Council brought suit in the Superior Court 
for the State of Alaska, First Judicial District at Juneau on July 16, 2019.163 
Because the parties agreed that the issues were legal questions not 
 
 157.  Id. at 2. 
 158.  Order re: Motion to Intervene at 1, Alaska Legislative Council v. 
Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. filed July 16, 2019), 
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/order.pdf; Who We Are, 
COALITION FOR EDUCATION EQUALITY, https://ceequity.org/about (last visited 
May 6, 2020). CEE has been a party to key impact litigation in Alaska public school 
cases over the last two decades. See Legal History, COALITION FOR EDUCATION 
EQUALITY, https://ceequity.org/legal-history (describing the Coalition for 
Education Equality’s involvement in cases dating back to 1997) (last visited May, 
6, 2020). 
 159.  Order re: Motion to Intervene, supra note 158, at 7. 
 160.  Teagan Hanlon, Alaska Legislature Sues Gov. Dunleavy Over Public School 
Funding, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (July 16, 2019), https://www.adn.com/ 
politics/alaska-legislature/2019/07/16/alaska-legislature-sues-gov-dunleavy-
over-public-school-funding/.  
 161.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and An Accounting, 
supra note 18, at 4–7. 
 162.  Id. at 4–7.  
 163.  Id. at 9. 
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requiring discovery, the court approved an expedited schedule for filing 
cross-motions for summary judgment and simultaneous answering 
briefs.164 The court then granted CEE leave to join the suit as Plaintiff-
Intervenors,165  and for twenty state legislators in their individual 
capacities to file an amicus brief in support of Plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment.166 On October 4, 2019, the court heard oral argument 
on the cross-motions for summary judgment.167 The court granted 
Plaintiff’s and CEE’s motions for summary judgment and denied 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.168 Defendants appealed to 
the Alaska Supreme Court on December 13, 2019.169 
E.  Parties’ Arguments 
1.  The Defendants’ Theory of the Case 
In Defendants’ view, the Alaska Constitution sets up an “annual 
budgeting model” with roles for both the executive and legislative 
branches.170 This can purportedly be seen in the interplay between several 
provisions of the constitution, mainly found in article IX.171 First, 
Defendants highlighted that the HB 287 funds violate the dedicated funds 
clause, which provides that “the proceeds of any state tax or license shall 
not be dedicated to any special purpose.”172 They then relied on a suite of 
additional article IX finance and taxation provisions to argue that there is 
an annual appropriations model that requires the budgeting process be 
conducted no more than one financial year prior.173 Under this model, the 
 
 164.  Order re: Joint Motion for Scheduling, Alaska Legislative Council v. 
Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2019), 
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/scheduling-order.pdf.   
 165.  Order re: Motion to Intervene, supra note 158, at 7.  
 166.  Order re: Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae, Alaska 
Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. filed July 
16, 2019), https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/order2.pdf.  
 167.  Order Scheduling Oral Argument, Alaska Legislative Council v. 
Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-0073 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2019), https:// 
public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/oral-argument.pdf. 
 168.  Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 10. 
 169.  Dunleavy v. Alaska Legislative Council, No. S17666 (Alaska filed 
December 13, 2019) (Alaska App. Ct. Case Mgmt. Sys.), https://appellate-
records.courts.alaska.gov/CMSPublic/Case/General?caseID=25798. 
 170.  Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 2–3, Alaska 
Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. filed July 
16, 2019), https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/defendants-
opposition.pdf.  
 171.  Id. at 5. 
 172.  Id. at 3–5 (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 7). 
 173.  Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 7. 
Defendants argued that this was achieved through a combination of four 
provisions of article IX. Section 8 “generally prohibits the State from contracting 
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legislature cannot pass appropriations earlier than the preceding fiscal 
year, and HB 287 would therefore violate this ban on forward funding.174 
Defendants argued that the interaction of these article IX provisions sets 
up an annual appropriations model that requires the budgeting process 
to be conducted no more than one financial year prior.175 Under this 
model, the legislature cannot pass appropriations earlier than the 
preceding fiscal year, and HB 287 would therefore violate this ban on 
forward funding.176 
Defendants invoked article II, section 15 (“governor’s veto clause”), 
which grants the governor veto power.177 The governor’s veto clause 
specifically provides that the governor “may, by veto, strike or reduce 
items in appropriation bills.”178 Defendants also argued this forward 
funding not only subverts the governor’s veto clause, but also the 
legislative process by effectively requiring super-majority voting to enact 
budgets.179 Defendants asserted that the education clause is not 
implicated in this case because “education funding does not enjoy a 
unique status” and is not exempt from the above provisions of the Alaska 
Constitution.180 Defendants further asserted that public policy concerns 
have no bearing on the constitutionality of forward funding and that 
Governor Dunleavy had no constitutional obligation to implement an 
unconstitutional statute.181 
 
state debt.” Id. Section 10 “permits the State to borrow money to fulfill 
appropriations for any fiscal year in anticipation of the collection of revenues for 
that same year, ‘but all debt so contracted shall be paid before the end of the next 
fiscal year.’” Id. Section 12 requires the governor to submit to the legislature “a 
budget for the next fiscal year setting forth all proposed expenditures and 
anticipated income of all departments, offices, and agencies of the State . . . [as 
well as] a general appropriation bill to authorize the proposed expenditures.” Id. 
Section 17(d) requires that money still available for appropriation “at the end of a 
fiscal year be deposited in the constitutional budget reserve fund until any prior 
appropriation from that fund is repaid.” Id. 
 174.  Id. at 6–7.  
 175.  Id. at 9 (“[T]he appropriations subvert the governor’s veto power and the 
legislature’s power of appropriation because if they are upheld, nothing would 
prevent a politically aligned legislature and governor from passing budgets for 
many years into the future knowing that so long as future legislature and 
governors were not similar in agreement the original budget decisions would 
stick.”). 
 176.  Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 
170, at 1–2. 
 177.  Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 9 
(quoting ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15).  
 178.  ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15.  
 179.  Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 
170, at 8.  
 180.  Id. at 9.  
 181.  Id. at 20, 24. 
37.1 LAWS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2020  10:18 PM 
106 ALASKA LAW REVIEW 37:1 
2.  The Plaintiff’s and Intervenor’s Theories of the Case 
Plaintiff and CEE relied primarily on three provisions of the state 
constitution to support HB 287’s legality: the education clause, article IX, 
section 13 (“appropriations clause”), and article III, section 16 (“faithful 
execution clause”).182 Plaintiff proposed a theory of the case that 
integrates the education clause into the constitutional analysis of the 
relationship between the executive and legislative branches regarding 
appropriations and budgeting.183 Plaintiff argued that because it is 
constitutionally required to fund the public school system, any analysis 
of that funding must include a holistic review of the constitution, 
including the education clause.184 Further, Plaintiff read the constitution 
to be silent as to the direct issue of forward funding, but viewed the 
practice as consistent with the process of appropriations outlined in the 
appropriations clause.185 Plaintiff alleged that the constitution does not 
prohibit forward funding nor limit the legislature’s appropriations 
powers, and that forward funding would be consistent with the annual 
budgeting model proposed by Defendants.186 
CEE had a similar theory of the case, agreeing that the education 
clause was highly relevant.187 It saw no separation of powers concerns 
implicated, nor did it view the public school appropriations as violating 
the dedicated funds clause.188 CEE also addressed prudential concerns 
 
 182.  See Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 3, 9 
(asserting the constitutionality of the appropriation under the education clause, 
and arguing that the governor’s conduct violated the appropriations clause and 
faithful execution clause); see also Complaint in Intervention, Alaska Legislative 
Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. filed July 16, 2019), 
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/complaint-
intervention.pdf (alleging that the governor failed his constitutional duty under 
the education clause, the appropriations clause, and the faithful execution clause). 
The appropriations clause states in part that “[n]o money shall be withdrawn from 
the treasury expect in accordance with appropriations made by law.” ALASKA 
CONST. art. IX, § 13. The faithful execution clause requires the governor faithfully 
execute the laws of Alaska. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 16.  
 183.  Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 
3–6, Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. 
Ct. filed July 16, 2019), https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/ 
alc/plaintiffs-opposition.pdf.  
 184.  Id. at 4. 
 185.  Id. at 9–10. 
 186.  Id. at 7, 11. 
 187.  Coalition for Education Equity’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 14, Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-
00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. July 16, 2019), https://public.courts.alaska.gov/ 
web/media/docs/alc/coalition-opposition.pdf. CEE dedicated a section of its 
brief, titled “The Education Clause is Patently Relevant to this Case,” to discussing 
the education clause’s relevance. Id. 
 188.  Id. at 4–13. 
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about public school funding, including the possibility of a gap in time 
between a ruling for the Governor and passage of a new appropriations 
bill, during which Alaska’s public schools would go unfunded.189 
F.  Superior Court’s Order 
The court found for Plaintiff and CEE, ruling that Defendants have 
“a constitutional obligation to execute the appropriations in [HB 287]” 
and that withholding the funds “infringes upon the legislature’s power of 
appropriation and duty to fund public education under the . . . Education 
Clause.”190 The court did not frame the question in terms of the education 
clause, but instead presented it as solely implicating the annual 
appropriations model.191 The court began its analysis by noting that the 
legislature may enact appropriations for a public purpose that is rational 
and valid.192 The parties did not dispute that the appropriations were 
rational and valid because the legislature had the valid purpose of 
maintaining public education.193 Thus, the parties presumed the 
appropriations did not violate the education clause. 
The court rejected Defendants’ arguments that the appropriations 
were nonetheless unconstitutional under either the dedicated funds 
clause or the annual appropriations model, finding that the HB 287 
funding was not a direct violation of the dedicated funds clause as it did 
not “earmark a particular public revenue source.”194 While the dedicated 
funds clause prohibits the earmarking of a state tax or license for a 
particular purpose, it is “intended to allow necessary dedication of funds 
once they . . . [are] received and placed in the general fund.”195 The 
appropriations for the HB 287 funding were from the general fund and 
did not violate the dedicated funds clause.196 
The court also rejected Defendants’ argument that the 
appropriations violated the annual appropriations model. It found that 
the constitutional provisions cited by Defendants at most demonstrated 
an aspirational model that does not outweigh the appropriations’ 
presumed constitutionality.197 Even if this annual appropriations model 
was constitutionally mandated, HB 287 would not violate that mandate 
because the bill had gone through the appropriations process in 2018, was 
 
 189.  Id. at 16–19.  
 190.  Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 9–10. 
 191.  Id. at 1. 
 192.  Id. at 4. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. at 5–8.  
 195.  Id. at 6. 
 196.  Id. at 7–8. 
 197.  Id. at 7.  
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subject to the veto of the sitting governor, and was subject to repeal by the 
legislature in the 2019 session.198 Therefore, the aspiration of an annual 
appropriations model was outweighed by the legislature’s 
appropriations clause power and the duty to provide public education 
under the education clause.199 Because forward funding was therefore 
lawfully enacted, the court ruled that Governor Dunleavy had a 
constitutional obligation to execute the appropriations under the faithful 
execution clause and refusal to do so would infringe upon the 
legislature’s appropriations power and constitutional duty to provide 
public education.200 
IV. THE EDUCATION CLAUSE IN ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL V. 
DUNLEAVY AND BEYOND 
Alaska Legislative Council is the latest in a line of school funding cases 
in which the court upheld a school funding statutory scheme despite 
underweighting the education clause in its analysis. The court has 
primarily reviewed these funding schemes through other constitutional 
provisions including the state equal protection clause, dedicated funds 
clause, appropriations clause, and governor’s veto clause.201 Here, the 
superior court followed the supreme court’s lead by analyzing the 
forward funding provisions under the dedicated funds clause.202 In 
deciding the pending appeal, the supreme court could establish a more 
principled jurisprudence by giving appropriate weight to the education 
clause, which grants the state legislature broad discretion in actions taken 
in furtherance of the provision of public schooling.203 In giving equal 
constitutional weight to the education clause, the court should adopt a 
presumption of constitutionality for school funding schemes. If the court 
takes this approach in Alaska Legislative Council, the forward funding of 







 198.  Id. at 7–8. 
 199.  Id. at 8.  
 200.  Id. at 9–10. 
 201.  See supra Sections II.C.3, II.C.4. 
 202.  Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 6. 
 203.  See Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971) (noting the 
“constitutionally mandated state control over education”). 
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A.  As Public Education Cases, School Funding Cases Should Be 
Decided in the Context of the Education Clause 
Public schooling cases are analyzed in light of the legislature’s 
constitutional duty to “establish and maintain a system of public schools 
open to all children of the State.”204 The supreme court has long held that 
the education clause “not only requires that the legislature ‘establish’ a 
school system, but also gives to that body the continuing obligation to 
‘maintain’ the system.”205 Because public school systems require continual 
funding, school funding cases are a subset of public education cases and 
are properly decided under the education clause. 
Despite the constitutional obligation to maintain public schools 
through adequate funding, the supreme court avoided deciding the two 
school funding cases it has heard, Matanuska-Susitna and Ketchikan, under 
the education clause.206 The two concurrences in Ketchikan noted this 
omission, remarking that the majority erred in not adequately 
considering the education clause.207 Avoidance of the education clause 
may be a strategic move on the part of litigants. In his concurrence in 
Ketchikan, Chief Justice Stowers noted that “the parties intentionally did 
not litigate this question [of education clause analysis].”208 Despite 
pressure from several justices during oral arguments, the parties insisted 
that the education clause was not at issue in the case.209 The parties’ 
avoidance of the education clause may have pushed the supreme court to 
decide the issue on other constitutional grounds.210 However, such 
strategic avoidance should not limit the court’s complete constitutional 
analysis. The court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the RLC not 
under the education clause, but the dedicated funds clause, relying 
heavily on a history of state and local cooperation in providing public 
schools.211 However, Justice Winfree noted that the RLC appeared to be 
 
 204.  ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 205.  Macauley, 491 P.2d at 122 (emphasis added). 
 206.  See supra Sections II.C.3, II.C.4. 
 207.  See State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86, 102 (Alaska 2016) 
(Stowers, C.J., concurring); id. (Winfree, J., concurring); see also supra Section II.C.4. 
 208.  Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d at 102. 
 209.  See id. (noting that, despite questions from the justices during oral 
arguments, the parties insisted that the education clause was not implicated). 
 210.  See id. (“I am concerned that the court was not given the opportunity to 
decide the dedicated funds question controlled by article IX, section 7 of the 
Alaska Constitution . . . in the fuller context of the public schools clause . . . .”); see 
also id. at 105 (Winfree, J., concurring) (noting doubt that RLC is constitutional 
under the education clause, but resolving doubt in favor of constitutionality since 
the issue was not litigated or briefed on appeal). 
 211.  See id. at 91 (majority opinion) (holding that “the required local 
contribution is not a ‘state tax or license’ within the meaning of the dedicated 
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an unconstitutional dedicated tax.212 Given Justice Winfree’s analysis of 
the RLC, this tension between the education clause and the dedicated 
funds clause is better resolved with a more thorough analysis of the 
education clause. If the court applied the education clause, then the RLC 
would be presumed constitutional while the party challenging it would 
have the burden of persuasion.213 Unlike the supreme court in Ketchikan, 
the superior court in Alaska Legislative Council noted that the funding was 
enacted “in furtherance of fulfilling the legislature’s mandate to maintain 
a system of public education under the [education clause].”214 The court 
adopted a presumption of constitutionality and placed the burden of 
persuasion with Defendants, though not explicitly under the education 
clause.215 
B.  The Alaska Constitution Grants the Legislature Broad Discretion 
Under the Education Clause 
In conducting an education clause analysis, the court should grant 
the legislature broad discretion in its actions undertaken to fulfill the 
duties to “establish and maintain a system of public schools.”216 
Extending this broad legislative discretion to school funding cases is 
supported by: (1) the plain text of the education clause, (2) the intent of 
the drafters as expressed at the constitutional convention, (3) prudential 
concerns specific to public education in Alaska, and (4) implications of 
supreme court precedent. 
1.  The Text of the Education Clause Dictates Broad Legislative 
Discretion 
The “analysis of a constitutional provision begins with, and remains 
grounded in, the words of the provision itself.”217 Under the education 
clause, “[t]he legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a 
system of public schools open to all children of the State.”218 The court 
noted several textual reasons for “pervasive state authority”: the 
language is mandatory rather than permissive, the obligation includes the 
continuing duty to maintain a public school system, and the legislature is 
 
funds clause.”) 
 212.  Id. at 103 (Winfree, J., concurring). 
 213.  Id. at 102.  
 214.  Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 5. 
 215.  See id. at 3 (“Because the Defendants are raising a constitutional challenge 
to the [HB 287] appropriations, they bear the burden to overcome the presumption 
of the statute’s constitutionality.”).  
 216.  ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 217.  Hickel v. Cowper, 874 P.2d 922, 927 (Alaska 1994). 
 218.  ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
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the sole body of government that is tasked with this duty.219 Courts have 
subsequently interpreted this duty to maintain to include an obligation to 
fund schools.220 
2.  The Intent of the Drafters Dictates Broad Legislative Discretion 
The court has noted that, “[w]hile prior practice and the framers’ 
purposes are not necessarily conclusive, an historical perspective is 
essential to an enlightened contemporary interpretation of . . . [the] 
constitution.”221 Contrary to the court’s holding in Ketchikan, which relied 
on a history of local involvement in the provision of schooling, the court 
in Hootch noted that prior to statehood, Alaska operated under a dual 
system of public education provided by the federal government, through 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the territorial government.222 Through 
the education clause, the drafters aimed to address the unique issues in 
creating a unified public school system in Alaska.223 Granting broad 
power to the legislature was purposeful; the drafters explicitly shifted 
from broadly directing that the state provide public education to directing 
that the state legislature be the “particular division of the state 
government . . . . that should make the provisions [for a public education 
system].”224 Delegate Armstrong spoke further to the intent of the 
Committee on Health, Education, and Welfare to grant broad powers to 
the legislature under the education clause: 
[I]n Section 1 . . . the Committee has kept a broad concept and 
has tried to keep our schools unshackled by constitutional road 
blocks. May I draw to your attention further the fact that we 
have used the words [“]to establish and maintain by general 
law”. This is a clear directive to the legislature to set the 
machinery in motion in keeping with the constitution and 
whatever future needs may arise.225 
While the intentions of the constitutional drafters on their own do 
not dictate the interpretation of the education clause, the clear intent to 
grant the legislature broad power to maintain the public education system 
weighs in favor of the existence of such a power. 
 
 219.  Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971). 
 220.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 221.  Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 800 (Alaska 1975) 
(footnote omitted). 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  5 MINUTES OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 1955–56, at 3312 (1965) (statement of Del. Hurley). 
 225.  Id. vol. 2, at 1514 (statement of Del. Armstrong). 
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3.  Prudential Reasons Dictate Broad Legislative Discretion 
Broad legislative discretion under the education clause reflects “the 
responsiveness of the constitutional convention to the unique problems 
in the vast rural areas of Alaska.”226 Alaska is the only state that is not 
divided into municipal governments with autonomy in providing local 
services.227 The state legislature is left to fill the gaps created by the unique 
governmental structure of Alaska, and without broad legislative 
discretion over the public school system, provision of services in more 
rural areas could suffer. 
Broad legislative discretion also reflects the importance of funding 
to the management of public education in Alaska. Compared to most of 
the country,228 Alaska’s state legislature plays a much greater role in 
funding the state’s public schools, contributing approximately two-thirds 
of the funding.229 This difference is because the history of public education 
in Alaska diverges substantially from that of other states.230 In general, 
there is a “persistence of attachment to government at the lowest level 
where education is concerned.”231 In Alaska, the oversight of public 
education initially fell under the purview of the federal government, 
rather than local communities.232 There is less of a historical basis for a 
system that “permits and encourages a large measure of participation in 
and control of each district’s schools at the local level”233 in a state where 
public education has never been provided for locally. This history and 
current practice of more centralized control and funding of schools weigh 
in favor of greater legislative discretion in school funding so as to more 
accurately reflect the unique funding structure that relies on state 
 
 226.  See Hootch, 536 P.2d at 803 (discussing how the education clause does not 
require uniformity and appears to contemplate various forms of education 
depending on a diverse array of circumstances). 
 227.  John Havelock, Alaska Needs to Finish the Job of Creating Boroughs, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.adn.com/commentary/ 
article/alaska-needs-finish-job-creating-boroughs/2014/11/25/ (updated June 
29, 2016). 
 228.  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45827, STATE AND LOCAL FINANCING OF PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS (2019). Nationwide, state funding accounts for under fifty percent of 
public school revenues. Id. at 2.  
 229.  BERMAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 2, 4. 
 230.  Barnhardt, supra note 5, at 2.  
 231.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973). 
 232.  See Barnhardt, supra note 5, at 11. In 1884, the Organic Act established a 
civil government in Alaska and directed the federal government to provide for 
education in Alaska. Id. Very little has been written about traditional approaches 
to teaching and learning among Alaska Native people. See id. at 1 (“I am always 
reminded of the scarcity of published information on the history of education in 
Alaska in general, and in particular, on the history of schooling for Alaska Native 
people.”). 
 233.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49. 
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funding. 
4.  Supreme Court Precedent Dictates Broad Legislative Discretion 
The supreme court has explicitly and implicitly recognized broad 
legislative discretion under the education clause in its jurisprudence. In 
its first analysis of the education clause, the court held that there was a 
“constitutional mandate for pervasive state authority in the field of 
education.”234 This interpretation has been reinforced by the court’s 
deference to the legislature when evaluating the legislature’s ability to 
provide schools in remote rural communities.235 The court has also 
implicitly recognized a broad deference to the legislature to fulfill its 
education clause duties through school funding. Though it did not rely 
on the education clause, the court has upheld various school funding 
provisions on a number of different constitutional grounds.236 The 
common denominator in the school funding cases is that the court 
recognized that the legislature has taken action “[t]o fulfill this 
constitutional mandate [under the education clause].”237 
C. The Education Clause Mandates Funding for Public Schools 
In recent decades, lower courts have consistently acknowledged that 
the education clause creates a constitutional mandate to fund public 
schooling. In two notable cases, the superior court ruled that, under the 
challenged funding systems, the legislature had not met its duty under 
the education clause and found for the plaintiffs before the cases were 
ultimately settled out of court.238 In Kasayulie v. State,239 plaintiffs alleged 
that funding for school facilities was racially discriminatory.240 In Moore 
v. State,241 plaintiffs alleged violation of the education clause by “failing 
‘consistently and repeatedly to adequately fund’ . . . constitutionally 
mandated education.”242 The court explicitly ruled that the duty to 
 
 234.  Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971). 
 235.  See supra Section II.C.2. 
 236.  See supra Sections II.C.3, II.C.4. 
 237.  State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86, 88 (Alaska 2016); see 
also Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 399 (Alaska 1997) 
(“By enacting a law to ensure equitable educational opportunities across the state, 
the legislature acted in furtherance of this constitutional mandate [under the 
education clause].”). 
 238.  EDUC. LAW CENTER, STATE PROFILE: ALASKA, https://edlawcenter.org/ 
states/alaska.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2020).  
 239.  Kasayulie v. State, No. 3AN-97-3782CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2011).  
 240.  EDUC. LAW CENTER supra note 238. 
 241.  No. 3AN-04-9756 Civil, 2007 WL 8310251 (Alaska Super. Ct. June 21, 
2007).  
 242.  Id. at *1 (quoting Second Amended Complaint at 2, No. 3AN-04-9756 
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maintain the public school system under the education clause includes an 
obligation to provide funding adequate to accord to schools a certain 
standard of instruction.243 
In Alaska Legislative Council, CEE brought a claim in intervention 
under the education clause that the superior court disallowed.244 The 
court was concerned with the “enormity and complexity of the issue” 
given the expedited timeline that had already been approved.245 
However, the superior court proceeded to note in its decision that “[t]he 
Alaska Supreme Court has explained that the statutory structure for 
funding public education in Alaska is established pursuant to the 
legislature’s mandate and responsibility to maintain a system of public 
education under the Public Education Clause.”246 
D.  The Supreme Court Should Decide Future School Funding Cases 
Under the Education Clause 
If the school funding cases are analyzed with proper weight to the 
legislature’s broad discretion to fulfill its constitutional mandate under 
the education clause, the court should adopt a presumption of 
constitutionality for school funding schemes employed in furtherance of 
the legislature’s education clause duties. In cases of intra-constitutional 
conflict regarding school funding, the court should give due weight to its 
education clause analysis. 
1.  In Reconciling Intra-Constitutional Conflicts, School Funding 
Schemes Should Be Analyzed Explicitly Through the Education 
Clause 
In questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation, the court 
“adopt[s] the ‘rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, 
reason, and policy.’”247 The text of the education clause, intent of the 
constitutional drafters, policy concerns, and precedent all support an 
interpretation of the education clause granting the legislature broad 
discretion in its actions to fulfill its constitutional duties to provide a 
unitary public school system for Alaska.248 If school funding cases are 
analyzed in light of this interpretation, the court’s analysis should include 
 
Civil, 2007 WL 8310251). 
 243.  Id. at *76. 
 244.  Order re: Motion to Intervene, supra note 158, at 3–4, 7. 
 245.  Id. at 7. 
 246.  Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 5 (citing 
State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86, 87–88 (Alaska 2016)). 
 247.  Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d at 90 (quoting Se. Alaska 
Conservation Council v. State, 202 P.3d 1162, 1167 (Alaska 2009)). 
 248.  See supra Section IV.B. 
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a presumption of constitutionality for statutory school funding schemes 
based on the constitutional mandate to provide adequate funding to 
“maintain a system of public schools.”249 
Under this presumption, the party challenging the funding scheme 
should have the burden to show either that an education clause analysis 
is inappropriate because the legislature’s actions were not taken pursuant 
to its education clause duties or that the constitutional mandate to 
establish and maintain public schools is outweighed by other 
constitutional concerns. This is the analysis hinted at by the superior court 
in Alaska Legislative Council, which weighed factors against a presumption 
of constitutionality of forward funding under the legislature’s education 
clause mandate.250 This presumption departed from the reasoning in the 
supreme court’s school funding cases, in which the court declined to 
conduct such a direct analysis under the education clause.251 
This presumption of constitutionality realigns the supreme court’s 
school funding jurisprudence with early public schooling cases, which 
focused heavily on the legislature’s duties under the education clause.252 
The court’s reasoning in early public schooling cases, while implicating 
other constitutional provisions, ultimately turned on the legislature’s 
duty under the education clause.253 For example, in Macauley, the court 
found that the Alaska Constitution grants municipalities broad 
governmental powers in local activities.254 However, the court held that 
“[t]he outcome of the local activity test in the case at bar is dictated by [the 
education clause].”255 In its thorough analysis of the education clause, the 
court in Macauley held that the “constitutional mandate for pervasive state 
authority in the field of education could not be more clear.”256 Under this 
reading of the education clause, the court deferred to the legislature to act 
as it “has seen fit” in the practicalities of the public school system.257 
 
 249.  ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 250.  See Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 6–8 
(finding no violation of the dedicated funds clause or annual appropriation 
model, but noting even if appropriations “undermine[d the] spirit” of the annual 
appropriation model, it would be outweighed by the legislature’s appropriation 
powers and duty under the education clause, an approach consistent with 
precedent weighing “competing values” in determining whether an 
appropriation indirectly violated the dedicated funds clause (citing Myers v. 
Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 68 P.3d 386, 391–94 (Alaska 2003)). 
 251.  See supra Sections II.C.3, II.C.4. 
 252.  See supra Sections II.C.1, II.C.2. 
 253.  See supra Sections II.C.1, II.C.2. 
 254.  Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 121 (Alaska 1971) (referencing Lien 
v. City of Ketchikan, 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963)). 
 255.  Id. at 122. 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id. 
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Such a presumption of constitutionality would be consistent with 
United States Supreme Court precedent, though such precedent is not 
binding as to Alaska’s education clause. In San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez,258 the Court held that “[t]he consideration and 
initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and 
education are matters reserved for the legislative process of various 
States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation 
of powers by staying our hand.”259 Centering the analysis of school 
funding cases on the education clause would align state supreme court 
jurisprudence with the broad deference granted by the Supreme Court to 
state legislatures. 
2. Application of This Rule Demonstrates That Forward Funding of 
Appropriations is Constitutional 
In Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, the Supreme Court of Alaska 
is presented with the opportunity to reevaluate its school funding 
jurisprudence and adopt an analysis centered on the education clause. 
The superior court determined that the interests of the legislature’s 
appropriations clause power and the education clause duties outweigh 
any implied annual appropriations model under the dedicated funds 
clause.260 In inverting the calculus of this weighing test, the supreme court 
should analyze whether the legislative duties under the education clause 
are outweighed by any other constitutional concerns. The superior court’s 
analysis strongly implies that the education clause is not outweighed by 
other constitutional factors because of the legislature’s broad discretion in 
its education clause duties and the fact that the proposed constitutional 
issue is only implied by the text of the constitution.261 
Here, the legislature expressed clear intent to act pursuant to its 
education clause duties in enacting forward funding in HB 287, noting 
that “[e]ducation is required by the Constitution and is a high priority 
program that legislators support.”262 The legislative history demonstrates 
the intent to provide budgetary stability for school districts through 
 
 258.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 259.  Id. at 58. 
 260.  Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 8.  
 261.  See id. at 7–8 (finding clauses in the constitution cited by Defendants “at 
most” collectively “express an aspiration” that appropriated funds be expended 
in the following fiscal year; even if forward-funding appropriations undermined 
the “spirit” of the annual appropriation model, the legislature’s “specific 
prerogative and responsibility” under the education clause, in addition to its 
appropriation power, would outweigh such concerns). 
 262.  LIEBELT, supra note 16, at 9 (“Education is one of the highest priority 
programs for the state . . . . HB 287 reflects the importance of education to our 
state.”). 
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forward funding.263 As noted in the Complaint in Intervention, forward 
funding is critical to alleviate the problems caused by a misalignment 
between school district and state budgeting cycles.264 The appropriations 
were made to avoid the negative impact on school districts’ ability to 
attract and retain quality educators.265 Because the legislature was acting 
pursuant to its duties under the education clause, the burden should be 
on the challenging party—here, Dunleavy, et al.—to show that other 
constitutional considerations overcome the presumption of 
constitutionality applied under the education clause. As the superior 
court found, forward funding is not a direct violation of the dedicated 
funds clause, and none of the other clauses cited by Defendants explicitly 
mandate the annual budgeting model proposed by Defendants.266 
Further, to the extent that an annual appropriation model is implied by 
various constitutional clauses, the “appropriations here do no violence to 
Alaska’s annual appropriation model.”267 Thus, in considering Alaska 
Legislative Council, the court should hold that no constitutional 
considerations outweigh the legislature’s broad discretion in fulfilling its 
education clause duties, and forward funding of public schools is 
therefore constitutional under the education clause. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Alaskan variable presents the state legislature with unique 
challenges, both direct and incidental, in fulfilling its constitutional duties 
under the education clause. To address these challenges, the legislature 
has developed creative solutions through various school funding 
schemes. Such innovations should be encouraged. Though the Alaska 
Supreme Court upheld recent school funding schemes, it did so under a 
number of different constitutional provisions other than the education 
clause. This muddies the court’s public education jurisprudence, which 
initially focused heavily on the broad discretion of the state legislature 
under the education clause. 
In school funding cases where the legislature has demonstrably 
taken action pursuant to its education clause duties, such as in Alaska 
Legislative Council, the court should adopt the reasoning of the superior 
 
 263.  See id. at 2 (noting the bill will “[a]llow school districts to know their state 
aid in advance of passage of the state operating budget” and “[a]void unnecessary 
teacher layoff notices due to passage of the state operating budget after school 
districts plan their budgets”). 
 264.  Complaint in Intervention, supra note 182, at 3. 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 6–7. 
 267.  Id. at 9.  
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court in reviewing the funding scheme primarily under the education 
clause and give broad discretion to the legislature. Such a holding in 
Alaska Legislative Council would shift the focus in school funding cases 
back to the legislature’s duties under the education clause. This analysis 
of school funding cases better acknowledges the difficulties that the 
Alaskan variable poses in the realm of public education, gives proper 
deference to the state legislature, and recognizes that school funding cases 
are public education cases that implicate the legislature’s duty to 




 268.  ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
